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An Econometric Study of Occupational 
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Labour economists typically assume that pay differences between occupations can be 
explained with variations in productivity. The empirical evidence on the validity of this 
assumption is surprisingly thin and subject to various potential biases. The authors use 
matched employer-employee panel data from Belgium for the years 1999-2006 to examine 
occupational productivity-wage gaps. They find that occupations play distinct roles for 
remuneration and productivity: while the estimations indicate a significant upward-sloping 
occupational wage-profile, the hypothesis of a flat productivity-profile cannot be rejected. The 
corresponding pattern of over- and underpayment stands up to a series of robustness tests. 
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According to standard economic theory, the competition among workers and among firms 
leads to relative factor prices that reflect economic forces: the closer labour markets are to 
perfect competition, the closer factor prices are to the value of the marginal product of labour 
and labour market inequality equal to differences in productivity between workers. 
  This explanation of pay inequality has been challenged by empirical and theoretical 
work on labour markets: ‘Sociologists have long been dissatisfied with [neoclassical and 
human capital theory], particularly with their silence about the many forces that generate a 
mismatch between marginal productivity or skills and wages in the ever-present short run’ 
(Weeden, 2002, p. 71). Indeed, a range of labour market theories hypothesize sources of 
inequality other than labour productivity, such as collective action, labour market institutions 
or the use of power and authority to obtain economic advantages (for overviews on standard 
sociological theories on labour market inequality see Kalleberg and Sørensen (1979), Berg 
(1981), Müller and Schmid (2003)). Although each of these theories on inequality focuses on 
distinct social processes, they appear to have in common that they associate labour market 
inequality at least implicitly to an element of ‘unearned’, or ‘unjust’ allocation of resources to 
dominant groups. On the other hand, economists have also developed explanations of 
differences between productivity and wages without having to abandon the assumptions of 
individual rationality and profit-maximizing firms. In this literature, productivity-wage gaps 
are thought to be rational strategies with which firms address a range of market distortions 
(Lazear and Shaw, 2007). 
    The abundance of theories on productivity-wage gaps is not matched by a 
corresponding body of empirical literature. In fact, empirical studies typically refrain from 
measuring productivity of occupations. Instead, occupational categories are distinguished 
according to their average educational attainments, on-the-job training, work experience etc., 
which are often lumped together under the catch-all term ‘skills’. This boils down to using 
variables such as educational attainment as proxies for labour productivity, one of the basic 
assumptions of human capital theory (cf. Mincer, 1958, 1970). Such an approach can be 
problematic: without any direct measure of occupational productivity it is unclear to what 
extent the selected variables are acceptable proxies. Instead of using skill proxies, we measure 
the marginal contributions of different occupational categories to firm-level added-value 
econometrically. This approach has been pioneered by Gottschalk (1978), who observed 
systematic differences between productivity and earnings for occupations (see Section 2.2). 2 
 
Improved data and recent developments in measurement techniques, especially the 
identification and treatment of different forms of bias, have created the need and the tools to 
put Gottschalk's results to an updated test. We take advantage of access to detailed matched 
employer-employee panel data from Belgium for the years 1999-2006 to study the impact of 
the occupational composition of a firm on wages and productivity. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Productivity-Wage Gaps 
 
Many of the theories predicting productivity-wage gaps are either formulated without 
referring to specific categories of workers or focus on gaps based on categories other than 
occupations, like age or authority. In this section, we show how some of the more prominent 
theories on mismatches between productivity and remuneration can be applied to the case of 
occupations.  
 
2.2.1  Theories Based on Efficiency and Individual Rationality 
 
A first set of theories emphasises the role of hiring and training costs. These costs can be 
considered as ‘quasi-fixed’ costs since they do not vary with the length of the employment 
period. To amortize quasi-fixed costs, a profit-maximising firm pays a wage below the 
marginal product (Oi, 1962). This effect can be further amplified if the skills acquired through 
training are firm-specific (cf. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, pp. 559-561). Quasi-fixed costs 
and skill-specificity are likely to differ across occupations and we would expect lower-than-
marginal-product wages for occupations requiring intensive training and/or specific skills. 
  Another strand of theories that can be applied to occupations uses more sophisticated 
assumptions about the individual utility function of the worker, notably by analysing the 
ramifications of two types of utility interdependence. First, utility may depend not only on 
one's own, but also on other people's wages (Hamermesh, 1975). As a consequence, high 
wage inequality could lead to lower utility and lower effort. Workers may perceive wage 
inequality as ‘unfair’ and decrease their efforts accordingly (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; 
Levine, 1991). Hence, there is an efficiency argument in paying high-productivity occupations 
in a firm below and low-productivity occupations above their marginal products so as to 
compress the overall wage structure. The second type of interdependence is slightly more 3 
 
complex as it takes into account not only wages, but also non-monetary elements of so-called 
hedonic wages (cf. Lazear and Shaw, 2007, pp. 102-105). According to this model, individual 
effort not only depends on the worker's relative wage, but also on her status within the firm. 
Status is interpreted as a good that can be purchased by foregoing a higher wage. The trade-
off between wage and status would lead to the same pattern of deviations from a productivity-
based pay as in the first type of utility interdependence, i.e. a compressed wage structure 
(Frank, 1984). Since occupations clearly differ with respect to status, from an efficiency 
viewpoint we would expect that high-status occupations are therefore underpaid compared to 
their marginal product and that low-status occupations are overpaid. 
  These theories predict a compressed wage structure in which high-skilled/high-status 
occupations are under- and low-skilled/low-status occupations are overpaid relative to their 
respective marginal products. By contrast, tournament theory predicts a convex relationship 
between a worker's pay and her position in the firm's hierarchy, to the extent that workers at 
the top of the hierarchy might receive wages beyond their marginal products. Tournament 
theory interprets these high wages as ‘prizes’ in a contest between workers at lower strata of 
the firm's hierarchy. Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that these prizes are part of an incentive 
mechanism to trigger investment in skills and effort from competing workers at lower levels 
of the hierarchy. For instance, ‘the president of a corporation is viewed as the winner of a 
contest in which he receives the higher prize’, but ‘his wage is settled on not necessarily 
because it reflects his current productivity as president, but rather because it induces that 
individual and all other individuals to perform appropriately when they are in more junior 
positions’ (Lazear and Rosen, 1981, p. 847). Whether this mechanism applies to our problem 
depends on the extent to which the prizes of tournaments are also associated with an 
occupational promotion. For instance, the winner of a tournament among a group of office 
clerks might be promoted to a management position. In this case the high wages of managers 
serve as prizes in a tournament among office clerks and can therefore exceed the manager's 
marginal product. 
 
2.2.2  Socio-Economic and Institutionalist Theories 
 
The literature on social norms and remuneration has also some relatively straightforward 
implications for occupational over- or under-payment with respect to productivity. Skott 
(2005) treats wage norms as endogenous, with past events shaping what is considered to be 
‘fair’ wages. This creates a hysteresis of the wage structure, slow adjustment to productivity 4 
 
shocks and therefore potential deviations from productivity-based pay. Similarly, Doeringer 
and Piore (1985) view the related concepts of ‘customs’ and ‘habit’ as important factors in the 
determination of employment rules in their model of internal labour markets. They argue that 
besides efficiency considerations (employer's interests) and demands for stability and job 
security (employees' interests), strong customs render changes in pay rules difficult. Given 
that technological change over the past decades appears to be skill- and therefore to some 
extent also occupation-biased (Autor et al., 1998; Acemoglu, 2002), the hysteresis of social 
norms could lead to overpayment of occupations whose productivity has been negatively 
affected by technological change, and to underpayment of the occupations whose productivity 
increased. As a result, we would expect to find a compressed occupational wage structure. 
  Many institutional economists focus on collective processes that complement the 
analysis of market forces. Osterman et al. (2009) affirm that employment rules and systems 
‘are the result of a political process in which competing objectives and rationalities play out a 
contest’ (Osterman et al., 2009, p.705). The occupational wage structure could reflect to some 
extent the competing objectives of occupations and their respective weights in internal 
decision-making processes of organisations. For instance, it seems plausible that any rent 
generated by the firm could be unequally distributed among occupational groups in light of 
apparent informational and power asymmetries across occupations. There is a parallel 
between this idea and the standard analysis of principal-agent problems: wages of occupations 
that cannot be controlled effectively by their principals (they have ‘Managerial power’) might 
be higher than predicted by the basic neoclassical model (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
 
2 Empirical Literature 
 
Surprisingly, only few empirical studies have focused on occupational differences between 
productivity and earnings. The empirical work on wage compression, for instance, does not 
consider productivity-wage gaps between, but only within occupations (Scully, 1974; Frank, 
1984). More recent econometric studies on productivity-wage comparisons have focused on 
categories like sex, ethnicity or age instead of occupations (Haegeland and Klette, 1999; 
Aubert and Crépon, 2003; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005; Cataldi et al., 2011; Cardoso et 
al., 2011; Dostie, 2011; Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011; Vandenberghe, 2011a,b; van Ours 
and Stoeldraijer, 2011). Other studies only include relatively broad occupational categories as 
control variables in wage and productivity equations (Hellerstein et al., 1999; Crépon et al., 
2002; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2007; Göbel and Zwick, 2009).  5 
 
  The empirical study on occupational pay differences by Weeden (2002) is therefore 
exceptional. Weeden measures to what extent occupational earnings inequality can be 
explained with activities directed at social closure, i.e. the construction by occupations of 
‘social and legal boundaries that [...] affect the rewards of their members’ (Weeden, 2002, p. 
59). Applied to our question, the basic idea of closure theory is that occupational groups 
engage in activities that shield them from external competition. In its simplest form, 
occupational closure can be seen as a form of rent seeking if closure yields monopoly rents to 
members of an occupation that restricts supply, for instance through a limited quota for 
licences needed to exercise in a profession (Sørensen, 1996, 2000). Weeden identifies a whole 
range of closure strategies: restricting the supply of practitioners, increasing diffuse demand 
for the services of the occupation, channelling demand to the occupation, and signalling 
quality of service (Weeden, 2002, p. 60). Her study concludes that ‘not all occupations benefit 
equally from social closure. The professions, in particular, benefit more than other 
occupations’ (Weeden, 2002, p. 92). Unfortunately, it is unclear to what extent Weeden's 
results actually describe productivity-wage gaps. Although the author is interested in ‘the 
many forces that generate a mismatch between marginal productivity or skills and wages in 
the ever present short run’ (p. 71), the particular set of closure strategies analysed in Weeden 
(2002) would not lead to such a mismatch. The reason for this is that strategies like 
‘restricting the supply of practitioners’ are equivalent to a shift of the supply curve of an 
occupation. While it is true that this leads to higher rewards for members of the occupation, 
the value of their marginal product would rise accordingly and no mismatch between marginal 
productivity and wages could be observed. 
  The reference for empirical inter-occupational comparisons of productivity-wage 
differences remains Gottschalk's work from the late 1970s (Gottschalk, 1978). Comparing his 
estimation of marginal revenue products with median earnings, Gottschalk could not refute 
significant differences between productivity and earnings for a set of occupational groups (see 
Table 1), a finding later confirmed by Gottschalk and Tinbergen (1982). The overall 
conclusion of this study is that productivity differences appear to be inversely related to pay 
differences, a finding that has to our knowledge not been directly refuted in the empirical 
literature. Nevertheless, new data and recent developments in measurement techniques, 
especially the identification and treatment of various forms of bias, have created the need and 




[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
3 A New Test for Occupational Productivity-Wage Gaps 
 
The test developed in this article is based on the estimation of a value-added function and a 
wage equation at the firm-level. The value-added function yields parameter estimates for the 
average marginal products for each occupation, while the wage equation estimates the 
respective impact of each occupation on the average wage paid by the firm. Given that both 
equations are estimated with the same set of firms and occupations, the parameters for 
marginal products and wages can be compared so that conclusions on occupational 
productivity-wage gaps can be drawn. This technique was pioneered by Hellerstein et al. 
(1999) and refined by Aubert and Crépon (2003), van Ours (2009), Göbel and Zwick (2009), 
van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) and others. 
  Equation (1) is a function linking a range of inputs of firm i to its added value Yi. 
 
) , ( i i i QL K F Y         ( 1 )  
 
where Ki represents the firm's capital stock and QLi is a quality of labour term. The latter 
allows introducing a heterogeneous labour force into the value-added function. 
  There is an abundant econometric literature on the estimation of relationships as the 
one depicted in Equation (1). In an attempt to reflect more accurately the production process 
inside the firm, specialists in the field have proposed specifications allowing e.g. for 
production inefficiencies or different elasticities of substitution between the factors of 
production. Since our focus is not on the production process itself, but rather on the 
comparison between productivities and wages for a set of occupations, we use a simple Cobb-
Douglas version of Equation (1), with substitution elasticities equal to one and the assumption 
of firms operating at the efficiency frontier. This restriction appears to be unproblematic as 
previous firm-level studies have shown that productivity coefficients obtained with a Cobb-
Douglas structure are robust to other functional specifications (see, for instance, Hellerstein 
and Neumark, 2007; p. 49). Equation (2) is the basic (Cobb-Douglas) value-added function: 
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where Ai is a constant. The parameters α and β are the respective marginal productivities of 


















, ) 1 ( 1        ( 3 )  
 
where Li is the total labour force of the firm i and Li,j/Li the proportion of occupation j in the 
total labour force. Substituting Equation (3) into (2) allows for different marginal 
productivities for each of the G occupations. If for occupation j the parameter θj is bigger 
(smaller) than unity, then this group has a higher (lower) marginal impact on productivity than 
the reference occupation. If all groups have ’s equal to one, then Equation (3) becomes QLi = 
Li , i.e. labour is perfectly homogeneous. 
As for the wage equation, Aubert and Crépon (2003) show that the average wage of 













































































1 1    (4) 
 
where wi,j is the average wage of Li,j and j = 0 the reference occupation with the wage wi,0. 
Similar to the interpretation of θ in the production function, if the ratio wj/w0 is bigger 
(smaller) than unity, then the marginal impact of occupation j on the average wage in the firm 
is higher (lower) compared to the reference occupation. Comparing marginal productivities 
and wage differentials across occupations boils down to comparing j with the corresponding 
wj/w0. 
 
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our data covers the Belgian labour market and consists of a detailed matched employer-
employee panel dataset that combines two complementary sources. The Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES), which contains worker-level observations for firms in Belgium within activity 
sections C to K of the NACE nomenclature (Rev.1). This covers the private enterprise sector 
and excludes agriculture, hunting, forestries and fishing (A and B), public administration (L), 8 
 
education (M), health and social security (N), collective, social and personal services (O) and 
domestic services (P). The SES contains a wealth of information, provided by the 
management of the firms, both on the characteristics of the latter (e.g. industry, type of 
financial and economic control, size of the firm) and on their workers (e.g. education, age, 
seniority, gross hourly wages, bonuses, number of paid working hours, sex, type of 
employment contract, occupation). Financial information on the same firms covered in the 
SES are obtained from the Structure of Business Survey (SBS), which provides data on the 
value added (per hour and per employee) by these firms. The fusion of the SES and SBS 
datasets has been carried out by Statistics Belgium according to the firm's VAT number.
1  
  Two filters have been applied to the original dataset. The first derives its rationale 
from neoclassical productivity theory, which relies on the assumption that prices are 
economically meaningful. This is why we deleted firms that are publicly controlled and/or 
operating in predominantly public sectors from our sample. All regressions are therefore 
applied to privately controlled firms only.
2 
  Second, we have eliminated firms with less than 10 observations, the reason for this 
being our use of average values at the firm level. In order to assure that averages (like, for 
instance, the proportion of employees in a specific occupation) are based on a minimum 
number of observations, we filtered out firms that provided information on less than 10 
                                                 
1  The SES is a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer respectively to the region (NUTS-
groups), the principal economic activity (NACE-groups) and the size of the firm. The sample size 
in each stratum depends on the size of the firm. Sampling percentages of firms are respectively 
equal to 10, 50 and 100 percent when the number of workers is lower than 50, between 50 and 99, 
and above 100. Within a firm, sampling percentages of employees also depend on size. Sampling 
percentages of employees reach respectively 100, 50, 25, 14.3 and 10 percent when the number of 
workers is lower than 20, between 20 and 50, between 50 and 99, between 100 and 199, and 
between 200 and 299. Firms employing 300 workers or more have to report information for an 
absolute number of employees. This number ranges between 30 (for firms with between 300 and 
349 workers) and 200 (for firms with 12,000 workers or more). To guarantee that firms report 
information on a representative sample of their workers, they are asked to follow a specific 
procedure. First, they have to rank their employees in alphabetical order. Next, Statistics Belgium 
gives them a random letter (e.g. the letter O) from which they have to start when reporting 
information on their employees (following the alphabetical order of workers’ names in their list). If 
they reach the letter Z and still have to provide information on some of their employees, they have 
to continue from the letter A in their list. Moreover, firms that employ different categories of 
workers, namely managers, blue- and/or white-collar workers, have to set up a separate 
alphabetical list for each of these categories and to report information on a number of workers in 
these different groups that is proportional to their share in total firm employment. For example, a 
firm with 300 employees (namely, 60 managers, 180 white-collar workers and 60 blue-collar 
workers) will have to report information on 30 workers (namely, 6 managers, 18 white-collar 
workers and 6 blue-collar workers). For more details see Demunter (2000). 
2  We did not eliminate firms for which public financial control does not exceed 50 %. The exclusion 
of these firms would reduce the sample size by less than 4 %. 9 
 
employees.  
  In addition to applying these two filters, the final sample on which our estimations are 
based consists only of firms that are observed in at least three consecutive years due to the 
inclusion of lagged differences in our models (see Section 5). This leads to a bias towards big 
firms because of the sample design of the SES in which big firms are more likely to stay in 
the sample for several consecutive years than small firms. 
  The three restrictions described above lead to the quasi-suppression of particular 
activities, for instance in the handicraft sector, but also leads to the fact that certain 
occupations (like liberal professions: lawyers, medical doctors etc) are under-represented in 
our data. The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 1735 firms yielding 5459 firm-
year-observations during the six year period (1999-2006). This panel is representative of all 
medium-sized and large firms employing at least 10 employees within the sections C to K of 
the NACE 1 (Rev. 1) nomenclature.  
  The occupational earnings we use in the estimation correspond to the total gross 
wages, including premia for overtime, weekend or night work, performance bonuses, 
commissions and other premia. The work hours correspond to the total remunerated hours in 
the reference period (including paid overtime hours). The firm's value added per hour is 
measured at factor costs and calculated with the total number of hours effectively worked by 
the firm's employees. All variables in the SES-SBS are not self-reported by the employees, 
but provided by the firm's management and therefore more precise compared to employee or 
household surveys.  
  The SES-SBS presents occupational data in form of the ILO nomenclature (the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations). We have estimated added value and 
wage equations with eight occupational categories for which descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 2. An estimation with a more detailed classification including 20 
occupations is presented as robustness test in Section 5.3. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 
  Although top-earning occupations have high average monthly work hours, it should be 
noted that these occupations are also relatively high have a bigger share in the total 
remuneration than in the total hours worked. The category ‘Managers’, for instance, has a 
share of 4 % in the total hours worked, but its share in the total remuneration exceeds 8 %. By 
contrast, blue-collar workers have a share in total remuneration that is considerably lower 10 
 
than their share in total work hours. For ‘Clerical Support Workers’, the reference category in 
our estimations, the shares in remuneration and work hours match each other closely. 
  Table 3 describes all variables used in our estimations at the firm level. The average 
values presented here are calculated on the basis of the 5459 observations with which the 
models in Section 5 have been estimated. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
 
5 Specification and Results 
 
5.1 Functional Specifications of the Model 
 
In this section we describe the three different specifications of the Equations (2) and (4) that 
we estimated. We therefore move from the general form of the added-value and wage 
equations to a set of functional specifications. 
  The model formed by Equations (5) and (6) is our baseline specification and similar to 
the model in Hellerstein et al. (1999). The βj in Equation (5) is the relative marginal impact of 
occupation j (note that βj corresponds to θj - 1 in Equation (3)). In Equation (6), βj
◦
  is the 
relative marginal impact of occupation j on the average wage (βj
◦ corresponds to wj/w0 - 1 in 
Equation (4)). The terms μi,t and μ
◦
i,t represent the error terms.  
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  The dependent variable in Equation (5) is the total value added by the firm i in period 
t, divided by the total number of work hours (taking into account paid overtime hours) that 
have been declared for the same period. The dependent variable in Equation (6) is firm i's 
average hourly gross wage (including premia for overtime, weekend or night work, 
performance bonuses, commissions and other premia). It is obtained by dividing the firm's 
total wage bill by the total number of work hours. Hence, the dependent variables in the 
estimated equations are firm averages of added-value and wages on an hourly basis. The main 
independent variables are the shares of hours worked by each occupational category in total 
work hours, (HOURSj//HOURS)i,t. This is a better employment indicator than the number of 
employees in each category since it takes into account occupational differences in working 
time. 
  In addition to the shares of occupations in total work hours, we also included a set of 
variables controlling for observable characteristics of the firm and its labour force. Since the 
capital stock of firm j is not available in the SES-SBS, capital is proxied with a dummy 
variable for nine economic sectors at the one-digit level of the NACE (I
m(NACE1)i,t). This is 
likely to compensate for the omission of capital since the latter tends to be correlated with the 
type of activity of the firm. Given the results reported in the empirical literature, van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer (2011) argue that the omission of the exact capital stock does not affect the 
estimates of production functions on firm-level data since the corresponding productivity 
effects tend to be small (cf. Hellerstein et al. 1999; Aubert and Crépon, 2003; Dostie, 2011). 
Additional dummy controls are I
k(FIRMAGE)i,t, indicating the age of the firm
3 and 
                                                 
3  Our data set does not provide the firm age directly, which is why we proxied this variable with the 
seniority of the firm's most senior employee. For the modalities of all variables and the 12 
 
I
s(FIRMSIZE)i,t, the firm's size as measured by the number of employees. 
  We also control for the composition of the labour force of firm i: EDUCATIONe,i,t are 
the proportions of educational groups inside the firm; WOMENi,t is the share of female 
workers; AGEGROUPSp,i,t are the proportions of different age groups; WORKDURATIONq,i,t 
are the shares of part-time and medium-time workers; NON-STANDARDCONTRACTi,t is the 
proportion of workers with contracts in which the employment term is not unlimited (for the 
modalities of all control variables see Table 3). The estimated equations also include the 
dummy I
t(YEAR)i,t for the year of observation. 
  We have estimated Equations (5) and (6) with three different methods. The baseline 
regression is a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator with robust standard errors 
(we use a Huber/White/sandwich estimate of variance, i.e. the errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; cf. Wooldridge, 2002). This estimator is based on 
both the cross-section variability between firms and the longitudinal variability within firms 
over time. 
  Our second specification fits a model based on firm averages over time for each 
variable. This is referred to as the ‘between’ estimator. In contrast to the pooled OLS 
estimator, the ‘between’ regression uses only cross-section variation in the data. The standard 
errors we report for this estimator are computed with a bootstrap procedure and robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  
  Pooled OLS and between estimators of value-added models have been criticized for 
their potential ‘heterogeneity bias’ (Aubert and Crépon, 2003; p. 116). This bias is due to the 
fact that firm productivity depends to some extent on firm-specific, time-invariant 
characteristics that are not measured in micro-level surveys. As a consequence, the 
occupational coefficients of these estimators might be biased since unobserved firm 
characteristics may affect simultaneously the firm's level of added value and its occupational 
composition. This is referred to as a problem of spurious correlation and could be caused by 
factors such as an advantageous location, firm-specific assets like the ownership of a patent or 
other firm idiosyncrasies. One way to deal with unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of 
firms is to eliminate firm-level fixed effects by subtracting the corresponding firm-level 
average from each variable in the model. Hence, our third specification is a fixed-effect 
specification that uses only longitudinal variation within firms. Since this estimator eliminates 
firm characteristics that remain unchanged during the observation period, the time-invariant 
                                                                                                                                                          
corresponding descriptive statistics in our sample see Table 3. 13 
 
control variables are not included in this specification. Our fixed-effects standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Huber/White/sandwich estimate of 
variance). We report the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier to test whether the pooled 
OLS regression is appropriate and a Hausman specification test to examine whether firm-
specific effects are random or fixed. 
  Estimating Equations (5) and (6) yields insight into the shape and significance of 
occupational productivity- and wage profiles. We also tested directly whether the difference 
between the added-value and wage coefficients for a given occupation is statistically 
significant by estimating a model in which the difference between firm i's hourly added-value 
and average wage is regressed on the same set of explanatory variables (cf. van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer, 2011). The resulting occupational coefficients measure directly the size and 
significance of each occupation's productivity-wage gap. 
  The reference group in all three estimations is ‘Clerical Support Workers’, a category 
that is situated in the centre of the occupational structure with respect to working times and 
hourly wages (see Table 2). This is a desirable feature for the reference group as it simplifies 
the interpretation of the relative marginal effects of the other occupational groups. 
  In addition to pooled OLS, between and fixed-effects (within) estimations, we have 
carried out a series of robustness tests to examine whether our results are sensitive to (a) the 
inclusion of dynamics in the model; (b) the way in which we account for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity; (c) potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables; ; (d) the use of a smaller 
set of control variables; (e) a more detailed nomenclature of occupations. The outcome of 
these tests is reported below and shows that the main conclusions presented in the next 
section are robust to alternative specifications. 
 
5.2 Estimation Results 
 
In this section, we first discuss the results for the wages equations and then the value added 
equations. Afterwards, we compare the coefficients from both equations.  
  Although the estimated parameters of our control variables are interesting results for 
their own sake, due to the limited space we do not discuss them in detail. In general, the 
coefficients of the control variables are often statistically significant (especially in the wage 
equations) and correspond to the results reported in the literature. For instance, both wages 
and value added increase with educational attainment and the age-profile is hump-shaped in 
the pooled OLS and between estimation (cf. Hægeland and Klette, 1999; Crépon et al., 2002; 14 
 
Hellerstein and Neumark, 2007; van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2011). Furthermore, the estimates 
indicate that a higher share of women in the firm's workforce has a negative impact on 
productivity and wages, with respective (statistically significant) OLS coefficients of -0.29 
and -0.26. Compared to the corresponding estimations for other countries, this result points to 
a somewhat smaller gender effect in Belgium than in Finland, but stronger than in Norway, 
France and the USA (cf. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005; pp. 642-643). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
 
5.2.1 Results for Wage Equation 
 
The most important result with regard to the wage equation is that the parameter estimates are 
remarkably insensitive to the model specification and reveal a clear pattern of categorical pay 
differences (see columns 2, 5 and 8 in Table 4). This is an econometric confirmation that 
occupational categories still play a central role in the determination of earnings at the firm-
level: the distribution of individual wages and salaries is structured by occupational 
categories. The coefficients of ‘Managers’ and ‘Professionals’ are consistently positive and 
statistical significant in all three models, thereby indicating that these categories have a 
positive impact on average hourly wage relative to the reference group (‘Clerical support 
workers’). The magnitude of this relationship ranges from 0.35 (‘within’ estimation) to 0.62 
(‘between’ estimation) for managers, and from 0.09 (‘between’ estimation) to 0.11 (‘within’ 
estimation) for professionals. The other five occupational categories have negative 
coefficients in all models, which means that these occupations depress the firm's average 
hourly wage relative to the reference group. The differences between the wage coefficients of 
the three blue collar categories (‘Craft and related trades workers‘, ‘Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers’, ‘Elementary occupations’) are small but statistically significant in 
all estimations. In the pooled OLS regression all occupational coefficients are significant at 
the five percent level; in the ‘between’ and ‘within’ regressions all categories except 
‘Technicians and associate professionals’ are significant (see Table 4). 
  The coefficients of determination show that our model explains more than half of the 
variation in hourly earnings: 67 % of the overall variation is explained in the OLS regression; 
65 % of the inter-firm variation with the between estimator; and 56 % of the intra-firm 
variation in the fixed-effects regression. All models are statistically significant.  
  The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier is 612.34, we therefore refute the null 15 
 
hypothesis that pooled OLS is the adequate estimator. This indicates the presence of spurious 
correlation due to unobservable firm characteristics. The Chi-squared statistic of a Hausman 
specification test is 493.56 and provides very strong evidence against random and in favour of 
fixed effects. Although the results are similar across the three specifications, the within 
estimator is therefore to be preferred over pooled OLS and between regressions. 
  The wage-occupation profile formed by the estimated coefficients is clearly upward-
sloping. To verify whether this profile is statistically significant we have tested whether all 
occupational coefficients are jointly equal to zero (the p-values of this test are indicated in the 
row ‘Flat profile’ in Table 4). The null hypothesis of a flat wage-occupation profile is rejected 
at the one percent level. 
 
5.2.2 Results for Productivity Equation 
 
Turning to the added-value equation, the results reported in Table 4 differ from the wage 
coefficients. In particular, the estimated (relative) marginal productivities are highly sensitive 
to the model specification. 
  The pooled OLS estimates (column 1 in Table 4) display an occupational productivity 
profile similar to the wage profile. For instance, a higher share of ‘Service and Support 
Workers’ not only depresses the firm's average wage, but also average added-value (the 
statistically significant coefficient is -0.31). Except for ‘Professionals’, who have negative 
(relative) marginal productivity but a positive impact on average wages, all other occupational 
coefficients have the same sign in the OLS added-value and wage equations. The coefficient 
of determination is 0.27 and we reject the hypothesis of a flat productivity-profile at the one 
percent level. 
  The results of the between estimation (column 4 in Table 4) mirror closely the pooled 
OLS estimator: six of seven between coefficients are significant and have the same sign as the 
OLS estimates. The coefficient of determination is only slightly smaller (0.27) and we reject a 
flat productivity-profile. 
  However, given a Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier of 3870.04, we refute the 
adequateness of pooled OLS for the estimation of the productivity equation. Since random 
effects are also rejected with a Hausman statistic of 612.34, the fixed-effects model is again 
our preferred specification. In contrast to the wage equation, the estimated productivity 
coefficients change once we account for unobserved firm characteristics via the elimination of 
time-invariant fixed effects. While the pooled OLS estimator explained 30 % of the overall 16 
 
variation and the ‘between’ estimator 27 % of the inter-firm variation in hourly productivity, 
the ‘within’ coefficient of determination plummets to 0.04. Although the ‘between’ and 
‘within’ coefficients have the same signs, all coefficients but one (‘Craft and related trades 
workers’) are statistically insignificant. In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a flat 
occupational productivity profile after eliminating fixed effects. 
 
5.2.3 Comparison of Coefficients from Productivity and Wage Equations 
 
In order to test whether an occupation's impact on the firm's wage level matches its marginal 
productivity, we have estimated productivity-wage gaps by regressing the difference between 
firm i's hourly added-value and average wage on the same set of explanatory variables we 
used previously. A negative gap is interpreted as over- and a positive gap as underpayment 
with respect to productivity. The results are also reported in Table 4 (columns 3, 6 and 9). 
  With pooled OLS, all gaps are negative but only ‘Professionals’ and ‘Craft and related 
trades workers’ appear to be significantly overpaid. The between estimator produces the same 
pattern except that the negative gap for ‘Technicians and associate professionals’ also become 
significant at the ten percent level. However, the outcome of the Lagrange multiplier and 
Hausman tests reported above indicates these results are strongly biased due to the existence 
of firm-level fixed effects.  
  The within estimator reveals a clear pattern of significant over- and underpayment. 
The occupations at the top of the wage hierarchy (‘Managers’ and ‘Professionals’) appear to 
be overpaid, the highly significant productivity-wage gaps being -0.31 and -0.12, respectively. 
‘Service and Sales workers’ as well as all blue-collar occupations come out as being 
significantly underpaid with respect to their relative marginal productivities. 
 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
 
We carried out several tests to assess the robustness of the results presented in the previous 
section. The main results stand up to a range of alternative model specifications.  
 
5.3.1 Static versus Dynamic Specification 
 
A dynamic version of the pooled OLS and within estimator has been computed by including a 
one-period lag of the dependant variable among the regressors. In other words, we allow for 17 
 
added-value to be not only related to contemporary inputs, but also to be a function of added-
value in previous periods (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Göbel and Zwick, 2009). The lagged 
dependant variable is found to be highly significant in both equations and reduces the 
significance of the occupational coefficients in the productivity equations even further than in 
the static specification (see Table A.1). The overall explanatory power of the added-value 
models is considerably higher compared to the static specification, indicating the existence of 
a dynamic component in firm production. 
  While a flat productivity profile is rejected in the dynamic OLS regression with a p-
value of 0.08, no significant differences in occupational productivity can be detected with 
fixed effects. This confirms our previous results. Furthermore, the significant and upward-
sloping occupation-wage profile revealed by the static model is also robust to the alternative 
specification, even though almost all wage coefficients are somewhat smaller in the dynamic 
than in the static version. Table A.1 also reports the gaps between the coefficients of added-
value and wage equations. The productivity-wage gaps in the dynamic fixed-effects 
specification are almost identical compared to the model without lagged dependent variable 
(column 9 in Table 4). We conclude that the pattern of over- and underpayment is very similar 
in the dynamic and static specifications. 
 
5.3.2 Alternative Procedure to Account for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
Our baseline model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between firms by subtracting the 
firm average from each variable in the model. An alternative strategy is to take first 
differences of all variables (cf. Aubert and Crépon, 2003). First differences do not estimate the 
level of productivity of firm i, but the change in productivity. Time-invariant heterogeneity is 
by definition not linked to changes in productivity and therefore controlled for. We have 
estimated the dynamic added-value and wage equations in first differences with robust 
standard errors (columns 1 and 2 in Table A.2). The results are similar to our preferred fixed-
effects estimation: all wage coefficients are individually and jointly significantly different 
from zero, while the hypothesis of a flat productivity-profile cannot be rejected. The 
productivity-wage gaps display the same pattern as with fixed effects and all gaps are 
statistically significant (column 3 in Table A.2). We therefore conclude that whether 
unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by taking first-differences or including firm-
specific fixed effects does not affect our conclusions. 
 18 
 
5.3.3 Changes in Occupational Shares May Need Time to Affect Productivity 
 
The observed contrast between productivity and wage equations could reflect that the 
dynamics of changes in a firm's occupational composition work differently for productivity 
than for wages. Imagine, for instance, that a firm replaces certain tasks previously carried out 
by traditional secretaries with IT-based solutions. This may lead to an immediate decrease in 
the share of secretarial staff and an increase of technicians and programmers in the total hours 
worked within the firm. As a consequence, the average wage of the firm will also change 
immediately. However, the effect on the firm's value added may not be visible until the entire 
personnel has learned to work with the new technology. Typically, certain tasks performed by 
secretaries and technicians will overlap during a transition period, thereby affecting 
negatively the observed productivity of both groups. The idea that changes need more time to 
affect productivity than wages – i.e. productivity might be stickier than wages – could also 
explain why we observe a significant occupation-productivity profile in the between 
regression. This estimator uses only cross-section variation in productivity and occupational 
compositions. Since differences in the occupational composition between firms are the 
cumulative result of past changes, the between estimator might capture the impact of 
occupations on productivity after the former had sufficient time to develop an effect on the 
latter.  
  To investigate the incidence of this phenomena on our results, we estimated alternative 
specifications of the baseline model that allow for a delayed impact of changes in 
occupational shares on productivity. First, we tested whether the productivity coefficients are 
affected if we use longer differences instead of the year-to-year changes presented in the 
previous section. For instance, columns 4 to 6 in Table A.2 are based on differences over two 
years (i.e. between t and t-2). In this regression the wage coefficients remain almost 
unchanged, although the coefficient of determination of the model decreases somewhat 
compared to the first-differenced specification. The productivity coefficients in the model 
with longer differences remain insignificantly different from the reference occupation, and we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of a flat productivity profile (the p-value is 0.61). Very similar 
results are obtained in a model based on changes over three years: here, the p-value for the 
flat productivity profile is 0.34 and the negative productivity-wage gaps for Managers and 
Professionals remain significant (all results cannot be reported here due to space constraints).  
  Second, we estimated specifications of our model in which the changes in firm 
productivity are regressed on lagged changes in the occupational shares, e.g. by regressing the 19 
 
change in the dependent variable between t and t-1 on the change in the independent variables 
between t-2 and t-3. We not only experimented with models in which lagged differences are 
based on year-to-year changes, but also with lagged differences over two and three years (i.e. 
changes in productivity between t and t-2 are fitted on changes in the occupational shares 
between t-3 and t-5). In none of the differenced models we can reject the hypothesis that the 
productivity differentials are jointly equal to zero. This means that we cannot find evidence 
for productivity differentials between occupations even if we allow for the productivity 
impact of changes in a firm's occupational composition to occur after a transition period of 
several years. 
 
5.3.4 Potential Endogeneity of Occupational Shares 
 
The fourth robustness test addresses the potential bias caused by simultaneity, a problem that 
has received considerable attention in productivity estimations (Marshak and Andrews, 1944; 
Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). At stake is the potential correlation of the explanatory 
variables with the error term. This situation can arise when firms anticipate exogenous shocks. 
For instance, if a firm in period t anticipates an increase in demand in period t+1, it may 
adjust its labour mix by already hiring more workers in period t. This could increase the 
proportion of occupations that can be hired and fired more easily. As a consequence, 
measured productivity and the proportion of these occupations would increase simultaneously 
in period t and lead to biased estimations of the corresponding parameters. A way to address 
the simultaneity problem is to use instruments that are correlated with the problematic 
explanatory variables and uncorrelated with the exogenous shocks (i.e. the error term). 
  To explore the acuteness of the simultaneity problem in our data, we have estimated 
two models with instrumental variables. First, we have estimated a dynamic model in first-
differences and instrumented the (differenced) occupational shares with the one-period lag of 
the level of these shares (see columns 4 and 5 in Table A.2). In other words, the lagged level 
of occupational shares is assumed to be correlated with future values of the instrumented 
variables but not with the exogenous shocks.
4 We estimated the IV first-differenced equations 
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with a Newey-West variance-covariance 
matrix and standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. This IV 
                                                 
4  We have experimented with a larger set of instruments, for instance by including lags of 
occupational shares for t-2 and t-3. However, only the smaller set including only one-period lags 
passed the test of weak identification. 20 
 
approach has been applied to productivity and wage equations by Aubert and Crépon (2003) 
and is now standard in the literature (cf. van Ours, 2009; Göbel and Zwick, 2009). Second, we 
have used IV to examine the simultaneity problem in the fixed-effects specification. While we 
have used (one-period lags) of levels of occupational shares to instrument the equation in first 
differences, we employ first differences of occupational shares to instrument the fixed-effects 
equation in levels (see Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Crépon et al., 2002). 
  For both estimations we have computed the standard diagnostic tests for instrumental 
variables. First, the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for underidentification tests whether the 
equation is identified, i.e. whether the excluded instruments are all relevant. The null 
hypothesis in this test is that the equation is underidentified. Second, the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic for weak identification is a Wald F statistic testing whether the excluded instruments 
are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressors (the null hypothesis being weak 
identification). Since a rejection rule for this test has yet to be established, we rely on the ‘rule 
of thumb‘ that weak identification is problematic for F-statistics smaller than 10 (cf. van Ours 
and Stoeldraijer, 2011). Finally, we compute an endogeneity test with the null hypothesis that 
the occupational shares can actually be treated as exogenous. The test is based on the 
difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation in which the occupational 
shares are treated as endogenous, and one in which they are treated as exogenous. If the null 
hypothesis of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is actually not necessary. 
  The results in Table A.2 indicate that under- and weak identification is unproblematic 
in our case: we reject the hypothesis of underidentification in both the GMM-IV and the 
instrumented equation with fixed effects at the one percent level; the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistics for weak identification are above 10 for both GMM-IV and fixed effects. However, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the occupational shares can actually be treated as 
exogenous: the corresponding p-values are 0.47 (added-value) and 0.57 (wage) in the first-
differenced GMM, and 0.35 (added-value) 0.59 (wage) with fixed effects. This means that 
instrumentation is actually not necessary since there appears to be no endogeneity in the 
occupational shares once we control for time-invariant, unobserved firm characteristics by 
either taking first differences or fixed effects. The simultaneity bias that has been diagnosed in 
other empirical studies is therefore negligible in our case. This may be an indication that 
simultaneity affects the age structure – which is the main explanatory variables in the IV 
regressions by Aubert and Crépon (2003) and van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) – more than 
the occupational composition of firms. 
  The results for GMM-IV reported in Table A.2 should therefore be read with the 21 
 
disclaimer that the IV estimates are less efficient compared to our baseline model with fixed 
effects and that instrumentation is actually not necessary in our case. This being said, the 
GMM-IV estimation leads again to a flat productivity profile and a significant wage profile of 
similar magnitude and sign compared to our preferred specification. Furthermore, we observe 
the same pattern of productivity-wage gaps, although the higher standard errors caused by the 
instrumentation create the impression that only the productivity-wage gaps at the bottom of 
the occupational hierarchy are statistically significant. 
 
5.3.5 Specification without Worker Controls 
 
Our baseline specification controls for the composition of the firm's labour force in terms of  
educational attainment, gender ratio, age groups, the extent of medium- and part-time work 
and the proportion of non-standard work contracts. This is the standard procedure to create a 
ceteris paribus effect for the occupation variable. An alternative perspective on our question 
can be obtained by regressing productivity and wage equations on occupational categories 
without the control variables in the model. In this case, an occupation's composition in terms 
of age or education is viewed as a constituent element of its impact on productivity and wages 
instead of isolating the occupational coefficients from these characteristics. 
  We have computed the dynamic pooled OLS and within estimators excluding worker 
controls and find our conclusions unaltered. Without controls, the magnitude of the wage 
coefficients in the fixed-effects regression further increases while the productivity coefficients 
are hardly modified. Occupations are affected asymmetrically by the exclusion of worker 
controls, with the increase of coefficients at the top being stronger than the decrease at the 
bottom of the hierarchy: for instance, the wage coefficient of ‘Managers’ changes from 0.34 to 
0.48, while ‘Elementary occupations’ decrease from -0.24 to -0.29. As a consequence, the 
productivity-wage gaps widen and remain significant if we exclude the control variables (the 
estimation results can be obtained from the authors but are not reported here due to space 
restrictions). Again, we cannot reject a flat productivity profile (p-value = 0.64) while the 
wage coefficients are individually and jointly significantly different from zero (p-value = 
0.00). 
 
5.3.6 Specification with Detailed Occupational Nomenclature 
 
Finally, we have tested whether an alternative classification of occupations alters the 22 
 
statistical relationships between occupations and added-value/wages. The intuition behind the 
test is that the strength of this relationship depends on the scope of occupational categories. If 
the categories are too encompassing, they might mask productivity and wage differences. On 
the other hand, more detailed categories also lead to fewer observations per firm and therefore 
a set of independent variables with a lower degree of precision. We have estimated our three 
baseline models employing a more detailed nomenclature including 20 occupations (due to 
space restrictions the results are not reported here). Again, we observe no substantial 
deviation from the baseline results. We cannot reject a flat productivity profile in the model 
that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (p-value = 0.70) and the occupational wage profile 
has the familiar shape with almost all coefficients being positive above and negative below 
the reference occupation (‘Customer services clerks‘). Most of the wage coefficients are 
statistically significant and we reject the hypothesis of a flat profile. In the ‘within’ estimation, 
the productivity-wage gaps tend to be negative at the top of the hierarchy (indicating 





We observe a contrast between the productivity and wage equation: while the elimination of 
firm-level fixed effects leads to a break-down of the statistical relationship between 
occupational composition and productivity, changes in occupations still explain more than 
half of the intra-firm variation in hourly wages and we observe a clear and significant 
occupation-wage profile. Three alternative interpretations of this phenomena can be 
envisaged. 
  First, the insignificant productivity differences between occupational categories in the 
within regression could be due to the variability of the independent variables. If the dispersion 
of the occupational shares is lower within firms over time than between firms, then this could 
lead to weaker (i.e. less efficient) statistical relationships between dependent and independent 
variables. As reported in Table A.3, the variation of all occupational shares is indeed lower in 
the within dimension, resulting in less efficient estimators with fixed effects compared to the 
between estimator. However, this holds for both productivity and wage equations and 
therefore cannot explain the difference between the two. In other words, the variation of 
occupational shares is indeed lower within than between firms, but the same level of intra-
firm dispersion produces simultaneously an upward-sloping wage- and a flat productivity-23 
 
profile. Hence, while the higher cross-section variation in the occupational composition 
explains the loss of efficiency when passing from the between to the fixed-effects estimator, it 
cannot account for the fact that this loss is considerably higher in the productivity than in the 
wage equation. 
  Second, the flatness of the productivity profile and the pattern of productivity-wage 
gaps could be the result of noise in the hours measure. In fact, it is plausible that working 
hours reported by high-paid occupations (‘Managers’, ‘Professionals’) underestimate actual 
hours since the working time in these occupations tends to be less regulated and often exceeds 
the reference hours fixed in employment contracts. This measurement error could lead to an 
underestimation of the productivity- and an overestimation of the wage-impact of these 
occupations. As a consequence, not only the insignificant productivity differences with 
respect to the reference category, but also the significant productivity-wage gaps we observe 
at the top of firm hierarchies might to some extent be due to underestimated working hours. 
This, however, can only be a partial explanation of our results. Even if the measured 
productivity-wage gap of ‘Managers’ probably exaggerates the overpayment of this category 
(-0.31 in our preferred model), it is unlikely that the underestimation of hours accounts for the 
entire gaps of all categories. In particular, although the actual working hours of lower white 
collar and the blue collar occupations are typically close to contractual working time, we still 
find insignificant productivity differences and significant underpayment for these categories.  
  The third and most obvious explanation for the difference in explanatory power 
between productivity and wage equations is the elimination of spurious correlation through 
the introduction of firm-level fixed effects. In other words, the strong impact of the 
occupational composition on firm production in the ‘between’ estimation is to some extent 
due to a bias: once we control for the numerous unobserved time-invariant differences 
between firms, no economy-wide occupation-productivity profile can be detected. The fact 
that the wage coefficients and their significance remain stable when moving from the between 
to the within estimator suggests that the heterogeneity bias is more pronounced in the 
productivity than in the wage equation. 
  A flat occupation-productivity profile is a surprising result in light of the standard 
hypothesis of wages being equal to productivity, but it actually echoes empirical findings of 
other authors who estimated marginal productivities for different groups of workers with 
fixed-effects regressions. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), interested in the effects of age, 
education and gender in Finland, obtain highly significant relative marginal productivities 
under pooled OLS, but only three of their six education parameters remain significant when 24 
 
fixed effects are eliminated. In addition, all coefficients for education have the wrong sign in 
their fixed-effects regression.
5 In a similar OLS regression of added-value in Germany, almost 
all age, education and occupation coefficients are found to be significant (Göbel and Zwick, 
2009). However, in the specification with fixed effects only gender and nationality appear to 
have a significant impact on productivity. Another related study is van Ours and Stoeldraijer 
(2011), who examine the impact of a firm's age composition on added-value in the 
Netherlands. Instead of using a fixed-effects estimator, they take unobserved firm 
heterogeneity into account by applying first differences. While all pooled OLS coefficients in 
their productivity equation are significant, their estimates in first differences are all 
insignificantly different from the reference group and indicate a flat productivity profile.  
  How do our econometric results compare with the theoretical literature on 
productivity-wage gaps? A compressed occupational wage distribution relative to the 
distribution of marginal productivities would lead to positive differences at the top and 
negative differences at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. None of our estimators 
displays such a pattern. The productivity-wage gaps in our preferred specification (column 9 
in Table 4) displays a clear pattern of significant overpayment at the top (‘Managers’, 
‘Professionals’), and underpayment at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy (‘Service and 
sales workers’, ‘Craft and related trades workers’, ‘Plant and machine operators’, ‘Elementary 
occupations’). Hence, our results speak against theories predicting a compressed wage 
distribution. If it is true that quasi-fixed costs and firm-specific skills are higher at the top of 
the occupational hierarchy than at the bottom, this appears not to be the main determinant of 
occupational pay rules. The prediction of the theory of interdependent preferences cannot be 
confirmed either: there appears to be no trade-off between a relatively high status and 
relatively high wages at the occupational level. We find no evidence that high-status 
occupations like ‘Managers’ and ‘Professionals’ are underpaid, and low-status occupations 
appear to be rather under- than overpaid in our preferred specification. Similarly, the observed 
pattern of occupational productivity-wage differences does not corroborate the theory 
according to which gaps arise from slow adjustments of ‘social norms’ (or the firm's 
‘customs’) to changes in occupational productivity. Since recent technological changes are 
typically assumed to have decreased the relative productivity of low-skilled occupations in the 
lower part of the occupational hierarchy, we would expect these occupations to be overpaid 
                                                 
5  In their fixed-effects regression all education coefficients are negative. Since the reference group is 
the lowest educational level (comprehensive schooling), this would mean than any additional 
schooling beyond comprehensive education leads to lower productivity (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 
2005; p. 637, Table 3). 25 
 
due to the inertia of wage norms. Again, the observed pattern of productivity-wage gaps 
provides no evidence for this hypothesis. 
  Our findings are easier to reconcile with the set of theories that predict upward 
(downward) deviations from marginal productivity at the top (bottom) of the occupational 
hierarchy. This includes the structure of occupational overpayment implied by tournament 
theory, certain institutional approaches to intra-firm relations and closure theory. For instance, 
we could interpret the overpayment of white-collar occupations as the result of the 
appropriation of rent generated by the firm. This could reflect that ‘Managers’ and 
‘Professionals’ have typically better access to firm-related information and a more prominent 
position in the firm's hierarchy of authority and control as compared to blue-collar 
occupations. Closure theory offers a complementary interpretation: the observed pattern of 
productivity-wage gaps do not contradict the hypothesis that the occupations with high 
remuneration are those that are more successful in closing off their positions against 
competition. For instance, access to the categories ‘Managers’ and ‘Professionals’ is typically 
regulated on the basis of scarce educational credentials that could be unrelated to higher 




Theories on the determination of occupational earnings typically make reference to 
productivity differences between occupations. This does not only hold for the human capital 
model: the literatures on the impact of incentive problems (Lazear and Shaw, 2007) or 
institutional factors (Osterman et al., 2009) on wages also formulate arguments in terms of 
productivity by predicting deviations from productivity-based pay, be they a compressed or a 
wider earnings distribution compared to occupational productivity. Unfortunately, the wealth 
of theoretical work on occupational earnings is not matched by a corresponding body of 
empirical literature so that Gottschalk's (1978) finding of occupational productivity being 
inversely related to earnings still stands unrefuted. In this paper we have used a matched 
employer-employee dataset to explore to what extent wages and salaries paid to occupational 
categories correspond to their respective marginal productivities. 
  Our econometric results confirm that occupations still play a central role in the 
determination of earnings. The estimations reveal an upward-sloping and significant 
occupational wage profile that is insensitive to the model specification and a series of 
robustness tests. By contrast, the evidence for a corresponding productivity profile in which 26 
 
the higher-paid occupations also add more value is much thinner. While such a profile is 
suggested by a pooled OLS model, we conclude that pooled results are biased due to spurious 
correlation between the level of value added and the firm's occupational composition, a bias 
that could be caused by unobservable firm characteristics. No clear productivity profile is 
found once we eliminate time-invariant idiosyncrasies (either through fixed effects or   
differenced equations). As a consequence, the hypothesis of a flat productivity profile cannot 
be rejected in our preferred specification. While this result is surprising in light of the 
classical hypothesis of productivity being the main determinant of occupational earnings, 
previous empirical studies with similar methodologies also reported insignificant productivity 
differences between employees when the latter are stratified by educational attainment or age 
groups. 
  Insignificant productivity differences between occupations can of course be attributed 
to the notorious imprecision of added-value equations, but this imprecision merely unveils a  
substantial variation in the occupation-productivity profiles among firms. One way to 
interpret our results is to see the absence of systematic productivity differences between 
occupations as a result of changes in production processes: the more complex, specialised and 
idiosyncratic firm-level value creation becomes, the more difficult it is to identify systematic 
productivity differences between occupations for the economy as a whole. What is striking is 
that firm-level idiosyncrasies in occupational productivity have apparently not affected the 
wide-spread use of occupational categories in decisions on employee remuneration. 
  Combined with an upward-sloping occupational wage profile, the absence of 
significant productivity differences between occupations suggests that occupations at the top 
of the wage hierarchy are overpaid with respect to their marginal productivity and occupations 
at the bottom underpaid. This finding confirms Gottschalk's results from the late 1970s and 
indicates the importance of alternative theories beside marginal productivity for our 
understanding of occupational pay differences. In this sense, the findings presented in this 
paper lend econometric backing for Max Weber's warning that ‘the ‘law of marginal 
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Tab. 1: Comparison of median earnings and marginal revenue products (in US dollars).  
Occupation  Median earnings  Marginal Revenue 
Product 
Discrepancy ratio 
Managers   8,189  4,035  2.03 
Sales   6,136  2,324  2.64 
Professionals   6,007  5,343  1.12 
Craftsmen   4,875  13,942  0.35 
Operations   3,797  8,598  0.44 
Clerical   3,640  5,804  0.63 
Labourers   3,154  5,804  0.54 
Service 2,871  5,804  0.49 
Source: Gottschalk (1978, p. 375). 
 
 























Managers  0.04  0.09  163.5  34.0 28.9 19.1 21.2 
Professionals  0.12  0.18  163.3  23.2 20.9 10.9 12.1 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 0.09  0.11  160.1  18.0  16.4  7.6  7.1 
Clerical support workers  0.21  0.20  151.3  15.4  14.3  5.9  6.1 
Service and sales workers  0.07  0.05  123.6  11.8  10.3  4.1  9.2 
Craft and related trades workers  0.21  0.17  148.0  12.5  12.3  2.6  3.2 
Plant and machine operators, 
and assemblers  0.17  0.14  158.9  12.6  11.9  3.9  4.3 
Elementary occupations  0.08  0.06  130.4  11.3  10.7  2.8  4.8 
Total 1  1  148.0  14.9  12.8  5.6  8.9 
Average values for 1999-2006; wages in 2004 Euros (deflated with Consumer Price Index). IQR is the 
interquartile range: w(Q75) -w(Q25). 31 
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics for firms (1999-2006). 
   Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Added value per hour (2004 Euros)  55.5  207.2 
Hourly wage (2004 Euros)  17.2  4.8 
Monthly working hours  6,510.3  7,909.4 
Firm age       
< 1 years  0  
2 to 4 years  0.01  
5 to 9 years  0.05  
> 10 years  0.93    
Number of employees per firm       
< 19  0.01  
20 to 49  0.03  
50 to 99  0.08  
100 to 199  0.18  
200 to 499  0.44  
> 500  0.27    
Educational composition of work force       
Lower Education  0.08 0.16 
Lower Secondary  Education  0.26 0.27 
General  Upper Secondary  School  0.18 0.22 
Technical/Artistic/Professional Upper Secondary  School  0.22 0.24 
Short  Higher Education  0.16 0.16 
Long Higher Education or University  0.11 0.14 
Share of female workers  0.25  0.22 
Age  composition of work force       
< 19 years  0.01 0.02 
20 to 24 years  0.07 0.07 
25 to 29 years  0.14 0.09 
30 to 34 years  0.16 0.09 
35 to 44 years  0.33 0.11 
45 to 59 years  0.29 0.15 
> 60 years  0.01 0.02 
Conventional work hours       
Part time (< 20 work hours per week)  0.02 0.08 
Medium time (20 to 38 work hours p.w.)  0.34 0.39 
Full time (> 38 work hours p.w.)  0.64 0.41 
Non standard work contracts*  0.04  0.1 
Number of firms in the sample  1,735    
Number of observations  5,459    
*Non standard work contracts include all contracts without an unlimited term. 
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Tab. 4: Estimation results. 
   Pooled OLS  Between  Fixed effects (within) 
    1 2  3 4 5  6  7  8  9 
   value added wage  gap  value added  wage  gap 
value 
added wage  gap 
Managers 0.28  0.46***  -0.18  0.45  0.62***  -0.17  0.04  0.35***  -0.31*** 
  (0.17)  (0.05) (0.16)  (0.31)  (0.09) (0.27) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) 
Professionals  -0.16** 0.11***  -0.27***  -0.33***  0.09* -0.42*** -0.01  0.11***  -0.12** 
  (0.08  (0.02) (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) 
Technicians  and  assoc.  Profess.  -0.05  -0.03 -0.02 -0.23* -0.03  -0.20*  -0.03 -0.04 0.01 
  (0.07  (0.02) (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Clerical support workers  Reference Reference  Reference 
Service and sales workers  -0.31***  -0.28***  -0.03  -0.33***  -0.21***  -0.12)  -0.01 -0.13***  0.11** 
  (0.08 (0.03)  (0.06) (0.12) (0.04)  (0.10  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Craft and related trades workers  -0.49***  -0.34***  -0.14***  -0.43***  -0.26***  -0.17*  -0.09**  -0.21***  0.13** 
  (0.06 (0.02)  (0.05) (0.11) (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Plant and machine oper., assemblers  -0.33***  -0.29***  -0.03  -0.23**  -0.20***  -0.02  -0.06  -0.23***  0.17*** 
  (0.06 (0.02)  (0.05) (0.11) (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Elementary  occupations  -0.41***  -0.33*** -0.08  -0.36***  -0.29*** -0.07  -0.09 -0.24***  0.15** 
  (0.06  (0.02) (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
R  squared  0.30 0.67  0.09 0.27 0.65  0.06  0.04  0.56  0.00 
Overall model significance (p-value)  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Flat profile (p-value)  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.62  0.00  0.00 
Observations  5,459 5,459  5,459 5,459 5,459  5,459  5,459  5,459  5,459 
All standard errors are robust and in parentheses. All models control for age and educational composition of the firm's workforce, share of female employees, 
conventional work hours and share of non-standard contracts. Pooled OLS and between models also control for firm size, firm vintage age and industry (for 
modalities of control variables see Table 3). Pooled OLS and within models include time dummies. The following diagnostic tests are presented: overall model 
significance = Chi-squared for OLS, F-test for between and fixed-effects; flat profile =  Wald test for OLS, F-test for between and fixed-effects regressions testing 




Tab. A.1: Dynamic specification of baseline models. 
   Pooled OLS  Fixed effects (within) 
    1 2  3 4 5  6 
   value added  wage  gap  value added  wage  gap 
Managers  0.05 0.31***    -0.22** 0.05 0.34***  -0.31*** 
  (0.08) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.09) 
Professionals -0.05  0.04**  -0.09**  -0.01  0.11***  -0.12** 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.06) 
Technicians and assoc. Profess.  0.04  -0.04**  0.07*  -0.02  -0.04*  0.01 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05) 
Clerical support workers  Reference Reference 
Service and sales workers  -0.06  -0.12***  0.00  -0.01  -0.12***  0.12** 
  (0.04) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Craft and related trades workers  -0.08**  -0.13***  -0.03  -0.08*  -0.21***  0.13*** 
  (0.04) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.05) 
Plant and machine oper., assemblers  -0.05  -0.12***  0.00  -0.05  -0.23***  0.17*** 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.05) 
Elementary occupations  0.09**  -0.14***  -0.02  -0.08  -0.24***  0.16** 
  (0.04) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.07) 
One year lag of dependent variable  0.80***  0.61***  0.70***  0.10***  -0.08***  0.05 
  (0.04) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) 
R squared  0.73  0.83  0.19  0.60  0.45  0.06 
Overall model significance  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Flat profile  0.08 0.00  0.00 0.73 0.00  0.00 
Observations  5,459 5,459  5,459 5,459 5,459  5,459 
All standard errors are robust and in parentheses. Both models include a lagged dependant variable among regressors and control for 
age and educational composition of the firm's workforce, share of female employees, conventional work hours, share of non-standard 
contracts and time dummies. Pooled OLS also controls for firm size, firm vintage age and industry (for modalities of control variables 
see Table 3). The following diagnostic tests are presented: overall model significance = Chi-squared for OLS, F-test for fixed-effects; 
flat profile =  Wald test for OLS, F-test for fixed-effects regression testing hypothesis that all occupation coefficients are equal to zero.
Columns 3 and 6 refer to the regression with the difference between added-value and wage as dependant variable. 34 
  Tab. A.2: Dynamic specification in differences. 
     First differences (Without IV)
a   Long differences (Without IV)
b   First differences  (With IV/ GMM) 
     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
   value added  wage  gap  value added  wage  gap  value added wage  gap 
  Managers -0.01  0.35***  -0.35***  -0.01  0.38***  -0.40***  0.00  0.28***  -0.27 
    (0.07) (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.10) (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.15) (0.10)  (0.17) 
 Professionals  0.01  0.10***  -0.09**  -0.05      0.12***  -0.17***  -0.07  0.11**  -0.18 
    (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) 
  Technicians and assoc. Profess.  0.03  -0.04*  0.07*  -0.06  -0.02  -0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.05 
    (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.04)  (0.09) 
  Clerical support workers  Reference   Reference    Reference 
  Service and sales workers  0.01  -0.10***  0.11**  0.01  -0.09***  0.10  0.16 -0.04  0.19 
    (0.04) (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03) (0.06)  (0.15) (0.09)  (0.18) 
  Craft and related trades workers  -0.01  -0.19***  0.18***  -0.06  -0.18***  0.11*  0.34*  -0.24***  0.58*** 
    (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02) (0.06)  (0.18) (0.06)  (0.19) 
  Plant and machine oper., assemblers  -0.01  -0.19***  0.18***  -0.02  -0.19***  0.17***  0.35**  -0.22***  0.57*** 
    (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02) (0.06)  (0.18) (0.07)  (0.19) 
  Elementary occupations  -0.03  -0.20***  0.16***  -0.06  -0.19***  0.12**  0.31*  -0.23***  0.52*** 
    (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04)  ( 0.05)  (0.03) (0.06)  (0.16) (0.06)  (0.17) 
  One year lag of dependent variable  -0.34***  -0.32***  -0.36***  0.13***  0.06***  0.11***  -0.34***  -0.32***  -0.35***
    (0.08) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
  Adjusted R squared  0.12  0.42  0.18  0.02  0.33  0.06  0.10  0.41  0.16 
  Overall model significance  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Flat profile  0.89 0.00  0.00  0.61  0.00 0.00  0.72  0.00  0.10 
  Underidenditifcation                0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Weak identification                17.49 15.99  17.64 
  Endogeneity                0.47  0.57  0.19 
  Observations 5,459  5,459  5,459  3654  3654  3654  5,459  5,459  5,459 35 
 
All standard errors are robust and in parentheses. First differences of occupational shares are instrumented with one-period lags of levels of occupational shares. 
Both models include a lagged dependant variable among regressors and control for age and educational composition of the firm's workforce, share of female 
employees, conventional work hours, share of non-standard contracts and time dummies (for modalities of control variables see Table 3). The following diagnostic 
tests are presented: overall model significance = Chi-squared for model without IV, F-test for GMM-IV; flat profile = Wald test testing hypothesis that all 
occupation coefficients are equal to zero; underidentification = test based on Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic; weak identification = Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic; endogneity = test based on difference of Sargan-Hansen statistics. Column 3 and 6 refer to the regression with the difference between added-value and 
wage as dependant variable. 
a Differences based on year-to-year changes. 
b Differences based on changes between t and t-2. 36 
Tab. A.3: Overall, between and within dispersion of main variables 
   Mean  Standard deviation 
Log added value per hour     
overall 3.76 0.56 
between  0.54 
within   0.19 
Log mean wage per hour     
overall 2.78 0.26 
between  0.26 
within     0.08 
Occupational shares in hours worked 
Managers    
overall 0.04 0.07 
between  0.06 
within   0.04 
Professionals    
overall 0.11 0.19 
between  0.19 
within   0.07 
Technicians and associate professionals 
overall 0.09 0.15 
between  0.14 
within   0.07 
Clerical support workers     
overall 0.18 0.19 
between  0.19 
within   0.09 
Service and sales workers     
overall 0.04 0.15 
between  0.16 
within   0.06 
Craft and related trades workers     
overall 0.23 0.31 
between  0.29 
within   0.13 
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 
overall 0.22 0.30 
between  0.28 
within   0.12 
Elementary occupations     
overall 0.09 0.19 
between  0.19 
within     0.09 
All statistics are based on the same sample of 1735 firms and 5,459 firm-year observations, 
meaning that every firm is on average observed 3.15 times during the observation period from 
1999-2006. 
 
 
 